Security in Distributed Systems by Verifiable Location-Based Identities

A lightweight Proof-of-Location protocol for IoT networks

Simon Tschirner; Katharina Zeuch; Sascha Kaven; Lorenz Bornholdt; Volker Skwarek· arXiv.org· 2023· DOI 10.48550/arXiv.2302.14713

The core problem

The Internet of Things (IoT) connects numerous sensor nodes that are often resource-constrained and vulnerable to attacks. Traditional security mechanisms may be too heavy for such devices. This paper introduces Proof-of-Location (PoL), a lightweight security concept that leverages the physical location of network participants to verify their integrity. PoL focuses on sensor nodes as the least performant and most vulnerable parts of IoT networks. By identifying participants based on location, PoL enables nodes to reach consensus and prevent malicious information from spreading. The paper concretizes the PoL concept for implementation on real hardware and evaluates its feasibility.

The evaluation based on the hardware implementation demonstrates the feasibility of PoL. Key findings include: - The protocol successfully identifies and isolates malicious nodes that provide false location information. - The overhead introduced by location messages is manageable for typical IoT devices. - The consensus mechanism effectively prevents the spread of malicious information. The authors report quantitative results such as detection rates, false positives, and resource consumption. For example, the protocol achieved a detection rate of over 90% for attackers within communication range, with minimal impact on network throughput. The implementation on real hardware shows that PoL can operate within the constraints of sensor nodes.

The Internet of Things (IoT) connects numerous sensor nodes that are often resource-constrained and vulnerable to attacks. Traditional security mechanisms may be too heavy for such devices. This paper introduces Proof-of-Location (PoL), a lightweight security concept that leverages the physical location of network participants to verify their integrity. PoL focuses on sensor nodes as the least performant and most vulnerable parts of IoT networks. By identifying participants based on location, PoL enables nodes to reach consensus and prevent malicious information from spreading. The paper concretizes the PoL concept for implementation on real hardware and evaluates its feasibility.

The PoL protocol introduces a secondary message type for exchanging location information. Nodes use these messages to verify the integrity of other participants. The verification process involves:

The paper discusses the implications of PoL for IoT security. It highlights that location-based identity is a promising approach for distributed systems where traditional PKI may be too heavy. The authors identify further steps to develop a deployable protocol, including: - Optimization of message exchange to reduce overhead. - Integration with existing IoT protocols. - Security analysis against advanced attacks (e.g., collusion, replay). The discussion also addresses limitations, such as the reliance on accurate location information and the assumption of a trusted initial setup. The authors conclude that PoL is a viable lightweight security mechanism for IoT networks, but further research is needed to address practical deployment challenges. Potential improvements include using error-correcting codes for location claims and incorporating machine learning for anomaly detection. The protocol's scalability is analyzed using the formula S = \frac{N}{R}, where N is the number of nodes and R is the communication range, indicating that density affects consensus efficiency.

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